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Abstract
The existence of adversarial examples capable of fooling trained neural network
classifiers calls for a much better understanding of possible attacks, in order to
guide the development of safeguards against them. It includes attack methods in
the highly challenging non-interactive blackbox setting, where adversarial attacks
are generated without any access, including queries, to the target model. Prior
works in this setting have relied mainly on algorithmic innovations derived from
empirical observations (e.g., that momentum helps), and the field currently lacks
a firm theoretical basis for understanding transferability in adversarial attacks. In
this work, we address this gap and lay the theoretical foundations for crafting trans-
ferable adversarial examples to entire function classes. We introduce Adversarial
Examples Games (AEG), a novel framework that models adversarial examples
as two-player min-max games between an attack generator and a representative
classifier. We prove that the saddle point of an AEG game corresponds to a gener-
ating distribution of adversarial examples against entire function classes. Training
the generator only requires the ability to optimize a representative classifier from
a given hypothesis class, enabling BlackBox transfer to unseen classifiers from
the same class. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets against both undefended and robustified models, achieving
competitive performance with state-of-the-art BlackBox transfer approaches.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks on deep neural nets expose critical vulnerabilities in traditional machine learning
systems [53, 3, 61, 8]. In order to develop better machine learning models robust to such adversarial
attacks, it is imperative to improve our theoretical understanding of different attack strategies. While
there has been considerable progress in understanding the theoretical underpinnings of adversarial
attacks in relatively permissive settings (e.g. whitebox adversaries [51]), there remains a substantial
gap between theory and practice in more demanding and realistic threat models.
In this work, we provide a theoretical framework for understanding and analyzing adversarial attacks
in the highly-challenging Non-interactive blackBox adversary (NoBox) setting, where the attacker
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has no direct access, including input-output queries, to the target classifier it seeks to fool. Instead,
the attacker must generate attacks by optimizing against some representative classifiers, which are
assumed to come from a similar hypothesis class as the target, before applying these attacks in a
single attempt against the target classifier.
The NoBox setting is a much more challenging setting than more traditional threat models, yet it
is representative of many real-world attack scenarios, where the attacker cannot interact with the
target model [13]. Indeed, this setting—as well as the general notion of transferring attacks between
classifiers—has generated an increasing amount of empirical interest [22, 49, 70, 68], though the field
currently lacks the necessary theoretical foundations to understand the feasibility of such attacks.
Present Work. To address this theoretical gap, we cast NoBox attacks as a kind of adversarial
examples game (AEG). In this game, an attacker generates adversarial examples to fool a repre-
sentative classifier from a given hypothesis class, while the classifier itself is trained to detect the
correct labels from the adversarially generated examples. Our first main result shows that the Nash
equilibrium of an AEG leads to a distribution of adversarial examples effective against any classifier
from the given function class. More formally, this adversarial distribution is guaranteed to be the most
effective distribution for attacking the hardest-to-fool classifiers within the hypothesis class, providing
a worst-case guarantee for attack success against an arbitrary target. We further show that this optimal
adversarial distribution admits a natural interpretation as being the distribution that maximizes a form
of restricted conditional entropy over the target dataset, and we provide detailed analysis on simple
parametric models to illustrate the characteristics of this optimal adversarial distribution. Note that
while AEGs are latent games [27], they are distinct from the popular generative adversarial networks
(GANs) [29]. In AEGs, there is no discrimination task between two datasets (generated one and real
one); instead, there is a standard supervised (multi-class) classification task on an adversarial dataset.
Empirical results on standard benchmarks using models that directly instantiate the AEG framework
show that we can achieve competitive performance—compared to existing heuristic approaches—in
the NoBox setting while maintaining a firm theoretical grounding. In particular, we find that our
framework can achieve state-of-the-art performance in many settings (e.g., attacking a held-out
classifier with DenseNet architectures on CIFAR-10), while remaining highly competitive in others.
2 Background and Preliminaries
Suppose we are given a classifier f : X → Y , an input datapoint x ∈ X , and a class label y ∈ Y ,
where f(x) = y. The goal of an adversarial attack is to produce an adversarial example x′ ∈ X ,
such that f(x′) 6= y, and where the distance3 d(x, x′) ≤ . Intuitively, the attacker seeks to fool the
classifier f into making the wrong prediction on a point x′, which is -close to a real data example x.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks and Optimality
A popular setting in previous research is to focus on generating optimal attacks on a single classifier
f [11, 51]. Given a loss function `, used to evaluate f , an adversarial attack is said to be optimal if,
x′ ∈ argmaxx′∈X `(f(x′), y) , s.t. d(x, x′) ≤  . (1)
In practice, attack strategies that aim to realize Equation 1 are conducted by optimizing adversarial
examples x′ directly using the gradient of f and then evaluating the attack success rate (i.e., how
often these x′ successfully fool f ).
In this work, we consider the more general setting of generating attacks that are optimal against entire
hypothesis classes F . Approaches that seek to be optimal in this sense can be tested by evaluating
attack success rates against unseen classifiers from the hypothesis class F . As we later show in
§3, under a game-theoretic lens the optimal adversary learns conditional distribution of adversarial
examples that can attack the whole class F .
2.2 NoBox Attacks
Threat models specify the formal assumptions of an attack (e.g., the information the attacker is
assumed to have access to), which is a core aspect of adversarial attacks. For example, in the popular
3We assume that the `∞ is used in this work, [30, 51] , but our results generalize to any distance d.
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whitebox threat model, the attacker is assumed to have full access to the model f ’s parameters and
outputs [62, 30, 51, 53, 11, 16, 17]. In contrast, the blackbox threat model, the attacker has restricted
access to the model, such as the type of observed input-output pairs from the target model, —i.e.
logits, final prediction, or even a finite resource in the number of staged queries [15, 23, 38–40, 54].
Overall, while they consider different access to the model, traditional whitebox and blackbox attacks
both attempt to generate adversarial examples that are optimal for a specific target (i.e., Equation 1).
In this paper, we consider the challenging setting of non-interactive blackBox (NoBox) attacks,
intending to generate successful attacks against an unknown target.
In the NoBox setting, we assume no interactive access to a target model; instead, we only assume
access to a dataset and knowledge of the function class to which a target model belongs. Specifically,
the NoBox threat model relies on the following key definitions:
• The target model, ft. The adversarial goal is to attack some target model ft : X → Y , which
belongs to an hypothesis class F . Critically, the adversary has no access to ft at any time. Thus, in
order to attack ft, the adversary must develop attacks that are effective against the entirety of F .
• The test dataset, D. We assume there is a test dataset D, which contains the examples (x, y) that
the attacker seeks to corrupt. In addition, we may assume to have access to a dataset Dtrain sampled
from the same or a similar data distribution to the one that was used to train the target model ft.
Notably, we can use such a dataset to train new models against which one can test our attacks.
• An hypothesis class, F . As noted above, we assume that the attacker has access to a hypothesis
class F to which the target model ft belongs.4 One can incorporate in F as much prior knowledge
one has on ft (e.g., the architecture, dataset, training method, or regularization), going from exact
knowledge of the target F = {ft} to almost no knowledge at all (e.g., F = {f ∈ DenseNets}).
• A representative classifier, fc. Finally, we assume that the attacker has the ability to optimize a
representative classifier fc from the hypothesis class F .
Given these four key components, we formalize the NoBox setting as follows:
Definition 1. The NoBox threat model corresponds to the setting where the attacker (i) has access to
an attack dataset D, and to a dataset Dtrain sampled from the data distribution as the dataset used to
train ft (ii) knows a hypothesis class F that the target model ft belongs to, and (iii) can optimize a
representative classifier fc ∈ F . The attacker has no other knowledge of—or access to—the target
model ft (e.g., no queries to ft are allowed).
Our definition of a non-interactive blackbox (NoBox) adversary (Def. 1) formalizes similar notions
used in previous work (e.g., see Def. 3 in [64] with Dtrain added as in their experiments). Previous
work also often refers to related settings as generating blackbox transfer attacks, since the goal is to
attack the target model ft while only having access to a representative classifier fc [22, 49, 70].
3 Adversarial Example Games
In order to understand the theoretical feasibility of NoBox attacks, we propose to view the attack
generation task as a form of adversarial game, where the players are the generator network g—which
learns a conditional distribution over adversarial examples—and the representative classifier fc. The
goal of the generator network is to learn a conditional distribution of adversarial examples, which can
fool the representative classifier fc. The latter—on the other hand—is optimized to detect the true
label y from the adversarial examples (x′, y) generated by g. A critical insight in this framework is
that the generator and the representative classifier are jointly optimized in a maximin game, making
the generator’s adversarial distribution at the Nash equilibrium theoretically effective against any
classifier from the hypothesis class F that fc is optimized over. At the same time, we will see
in Proposition 1 that the min and max in our formulation (AEG) can be switched. It implies that,
while optimized, the model fc converges to a robust classifier against any attack generated by the
generator g [51, 67], and leads to increasingly transferable attacks as the adversarial game progresses.
Framework. Given an input-output pair of datapoints (x, y) ∼ D, the generator network g is trained
to learn a distribution of adversarial examples pcond(·|x, y) that—conditioned on an example to attack
4Previous work [64] usually assumes to have access to the architecture of ft; we are more general by
assuming access to a hypothesis class F containing ft; e.g., DenseNets can represent ConvNets.
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(x, y)—maps a prior distribution pz on Z onto a distribution on X . The classifier network fc is
simultaneously optimized to perform robust classification over the resulting distribution pg defined
in (2). Overall, the generator g and the classifier fc play the following, two-player zero-sum game:
max
g∈G
min
fc∈F
E(x,y)∼D,z∼pz [`(fc(g(x, y, z)), y)] =: ϕ(fc, g) (AEG)
where the generator g ∈ G is restricted by the similarity constraint d(g(x, y, z), x) ≤  , ∀x, y, z ∈
X × Y × Z . Once the generator g is trained, one can generate adversarial examples against any
classifier in ft ∈ F , without queries, by simply sampling z ∼ pz and computing g(x, y, z).
Connection with NoBox attacks. The NoBox threat model (Def. 1) corresponds to a setting where
the attacker does not know the target model ft but only a hypothesis class F such that ft ∈ F . With
such knowledge, one cannot hope to be better than the most pessimistic situation where ft is the best
defender in F . Our maximin formulation (AEG) encapsulates such a worst-case scenario where the
generator aims at finding attacks against the best performing f in F .
Objective of the generator. When trying to attack infinite capacity classifiers—i.e., F contains any
measurable function—the goal of the generator can be seen as generating the adversarial distribution
pg with the highest expected conditional entropy Ex[
∑
y pg(y|x) log pg(y|x)], where pg is defined as
(x′, y) ∼ pg ⇔ x′ = g(x, y, z) , (x, y) ∼ D , z ∼ pz with d(x′, x) ≤  . (2)
When trying to attack a specific hypothesis class F (e.g., a particular convolutional architecture), the
generator aims at maximizing a notion of restricted entropy defined implicitly through the class F .
Thus, the optimal generator in an (AEG) is primarily determined by the statistics of D itself, rather
any specifics of a target model. We formalize these high level concepts in §4.2.
Biasing training with prior knowledge. In practice, if one knows that the target ft was trained on a
non-adversarial dataset, one can bias the adversarial examples toward performing well on a classifier
fs pretrained on a similar dataset Dtrain, leading to the following game:
max
g∈G
min
fc∈F
E(x,y)∼D,z∼pz [`(fc(g(x, y, z)), y)] + λ`(fs(g(x, y, z)), y)] =: ϕλ(f, g). (3)
Note that fs is fixed and that λ = 0 recovers (AEG). Such modifications in the maximin objective
as well as setting the way fc is trained (e.g., optimizer, regularization, additional dataset) biases
the training of the representative classifier and corresponds to an implicit incorporation of prior
knowledge on the target ft in the hypothesis class F .
4 Theoretical results
We note D to be the dataset used in (AEG) and pg the joint adversarial distribution on (x, y) induced
by g defined in (2). The representative classifier is the score function fc : X → R|Y| with which we
make predictions by selecting the label with the highest score. If we assume that we can generate any
adversarial distribution respecting the proximity constraint (2), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If ` is the cross entropy loss, one has access to any measurable g respecting the
proximity constraint in (2), and the class F of classifier is convex, then we can switch min and max
in (AEG), i.e.,
min
fc∈F
max
g∈G
ϕλ(fc, g) = max
g∈G
min
fc∈F
ϕλ(fc, g) (4)
The assumption that we have access to any measurable g is standard in the literature [30, Prop. 2]
and has often been referred to as “if g has enough capacity”. Such a minimax result implies the
existence of a Nash equilibrium for the game, which is a well defined target for learning. Moreover, a
Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for gradient descent-ascent dynamics; we can thus hope for
achieving such a solution by using a gradient-based learning algorithm on (AEG). Prop. 1 applies in
two main cases of interest: (i) infinite capacity, i.e., when F is any measurable function. (ii) linear
classifiers with fixed features ψ : X → Rp, i.e., F = {w>ψ(·) , w ∈ R|Y|×p}. This second setting
is particularly useful to build intuitions on the properties of (AEG), as we will see in §4.1 and Fig. 1.
4
4.1 A simple setup: binary classification with logistic regression
Let us now consider a binary classification setup where Y = {±1} and F is the class of linear
classifiers with linear features, i.e fw(x) = w>x. In this case, the payoff of the game (AEG) is,
ϕ(fω, g) := E(x,y)∼D, z∼pz [log(1 + e
−y·w>g(x,y,z))] (5)
This example is similar to the one presented in [30]. However, our purpose is different since we focus
on characterizing the optimal generator of the minimax game (4). We show that the optimal generator
can attack any classifier in F by shifting the means of the two classes of the dataset D.
Proposition 2. If the generator is allowed to generate any `∞ perturbations. The optimal represen-
tative classifier is the solution of the following `1 regularized logistic regression
w∗ ∈ arg min
w
E(x,y)∼D[log(1 + e−y·w
>x+‖w‖1)] . (6)
Moreover if ω∗ has no zero entry, the optimal generator is g∗(x, y) = x − y ·  sign(w∗), is
deterministic and the pair (fw∗ , g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (5).
A surprising fact is that, unlike in the general setting of Proposition 1, the generator is deterministic
(i.e., does not depend on a latent variable z). This follows from the simple structure of classifiers in
this class, which allow for a closed form solution for g∗. In general, one cannot expect to achieve
an equilibrium with a deterministic generator. As previously noted by Goodfellow et al. [30], `∞
adversarial perturbation leads to a `1 regularization.5 With this example, we want to illustrate how
the optimal generator can attack an entire class of functions with limited capacity: linear classifiers
are mostly sensitive to the mean of the distribution of each class; the optimal generator leverages this
fact by moving these means closer to the decision boundary.
4.2 General multi-class classification
In this section, we show that, for a given hypothesis class F , the generated distribution achieving the
global maximin against fc ∈ F can be interpreted as the distribution with the highest F -entropy. For
a given distribution pg , its F-entropy is the minimum expected risk under pg one can achieve in F .
Definition 2. For a given distribution (x, y) ∼ pg we define the F-entropy of pg as
HF (pg) := min
fc∈F
E(x,y)∼pg [`(fc(x), y)] where ` is the cross entropy loss. (7)
Thus F-entropy quantifies the amount of “classification information" available in pg using the class
of classifiers F . If the F-entropy is large, (x, y) ∼ pg cannot be easily classified with a function fc
in F . Moreover, it is an upper-bound on the expected conditional entropy of the distribution pg .
Proposition 3. The F-entropy is a decreasing function of F , i.e., for any F1 ⊂ F2,
HF1(pg) ≥ HF2(pg) ≥ Hy(pg) := Ex∼px [H(pg(·|x))] .
where H(p(·|x)) := ∑y∈Y p(y|x) ln p(y|x) is the entropy of the conditional distribution p(y|x).
For a given class F , the solution to an (AEG) game can be seen as one which finds an adversarial
distribution of maximal F-entropy regularized towards attacking the particular model fs,
max
g∈G
min
fc∈F
ϕλ(fc, g) = max
g∈G
HF (pg) + λEpg [`(fs(x), y)] . (8)
This alternative perspective on the game (AEG) shares similarities with the divergence minimization
perspective on GANs [36]: in both cases, the inner optimization with respect to the class of classifiers
implicitly defines a meaningful quantity to optimize for the generator. However, while in GANs it
represents a divergence between two distributions, in (AEG) this corresponds to a notion of entropy.
A high-level interpretation of F-entropy maximization is that it implicitly defines a metric for
distributions which are challenging to classify with only access to classifiers in F . Overall, the
optimal generated distribution pg can be seen as the most adversarial dataset against the class F .
Properties of the F-entropy. We illustrate the idea that the optimal generator and the F-entropy
5One can actually generalize Proposition 2 to a perturbation with respect to a general norm ‖ · ‖, in that case,
the -regularization for the classifier would be with respect to the dual norm ‖ · ‖∗ := max‖u‖≤1〈·, u〉.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 3 for three classes of classifiers in the context of logistic regression for the
two moon dataset of scikit-learn [57] with linear and polynomial (of degree 3 and 5) features. Left: Scatter plot
of the clean or adversarial dataset and the associated optimal decision boundary. For the adversarial dataset, each
corresponding clean example is represented with a N/N and is connected to its respective adversarial example
•/•. Right: value of the F-entropy for the different classes as a function of the number of iterations.
depend on the hypothesis classF using a simple example. To do so, we perform logistic regression (5)
with linear and polynomial (of degree 3 and 5) features (respectively called Linear, Poly3, and
Poly5) on the two moon dataset of scikit-learn [57]. Note that we have Linear ⊂ Poly3 ⊂ Poly5.
For simplicity, we consider a deterministic generator g(x, y) that is realized by computing the
maximization step via 2D grid-search on the  neighborhood of x. We train our models by successively
fully solving the minimization step and the maximization step in (5).
We present the results in Figure 1. One iteration corresponds to the computation of the optimal
classifier against the current adversarial distribution pg (also giving the value of the F-entropy),
followed by the computation of the new optimal adversarial p′g against this new classifier. The left
plot illustrates the fact that the way of attacking a dataset depends on the class considered. For
instance, when considering linear classifiers, the attack is a uniform translation on all the data-points
of the same class. While when considering polynomial features, the optimal adversarial dataset
pushes the the corners of the two moons closer together. In the right plot, we can see an illustration
of Proposition 3, where the F-entropy takes on a smaller value for larger classes of classifiers.
5 Attacking in the Wild: Experiments and Results
We investigate the application of our AEG framework to produce adversarial examples against
classifiers trained on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.6 Through our experiments we seek to
answer the following questions:
(Q1) Known-Architecture Attacks. Can we effectively generate attacks when we only know the
architecture (but not the parameters) of the target model? In this case, the architecture specifies
the hypothesis class of the target model, but have no access to the target model itself.
(Q2) Architecture Transfer Attacks. Can we generate effective attacks even when the representa-
tive classifier (fc) that we use during optimization implements a distinct architecture from the
target model (ft)? In this experiment, we do not even know the specific architecture of the
target model and must implicitly attack a much larger hypothesis class.
(Q3) Attacking Robust Classifiers. Can we successfully attack robustified classifiers [51, 64]?
Under standard PGD adversarial training [51] this corresponds to a worst-case setting for
our attacker. While for ensemble adversarial training [64] this involves injecting adversarial
examples from other architectures, thus expanding the hypothesis class of the target model.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We perform all attacks, including baselines, on test datasets D of size 256 and with respect to the `∞
norm constraint with  = 0.3 for MNIST and  = 0.03125 for CIFAR-10.
Model details. We train both the generator (g) and representative classifier (fc) using stochastic
gradient descent-ascent with the ExtraAdam optimizer [26] and held out target models, ft, are trained
6Code will be released after the review process
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offline using SGD with Armijo line search [66]. Full details of our model architectures employed
in our AEG framework, as well as details on hyperparameter tuning, can be found in Appendix §C.
In order to generate adversarial perturbations over images that obey -ball constraints, we employ a
scaled tanh output layer to scale the output of the generator to (0, 1), subtract the clean images, and
finally apply an elementwise multiplication by . Note that—in addition to training against fc—in
practice we also find it beneficial to include a pre-trained and fixed classifier fs as a mechanism
to incorporate prior knowledge during AEG optimization. Intuitively, fs plays an analogous role
as the representative classifier fc but is pre-trained on Dtrain and remains fixed during optimization,
providing additional gradient signal and a source of stability during the optimization process.
Baselines. Throughout our experiments we rely on four representative blackbox attack strategies
adapted to the NoBox setting: the Momentum-Iterative Attack (MI-Attack) [21], the Input Diversity
(DI-Attack)[70], the Translation-Invariant (TID-Attack) [22] and the Skip Gradient Method (SGM-
Attack) [68]. For fair comparison, we inherit all hyperparameter settings from their respective papers
and note that certain attacks are architecture dependent such as the SGM-attack, which is only
permitted in architectures that contain skip connections.
5.2 Results
We now address the core experimental questions (Q1-Q3), highlighting the performance of adversarial
examples crafted using our AEG framework.
Q1: Known-Architecture Attacks. We evaluate the ability of AEG adversarial examples to attack
different models from a given hypothesis class, specified by a neural network architecture. Specifi-
cally, we train 20 LeNet [45] classifiers on MNIST [44] and 10 classifiers using the Wide ResNet
architecture [72] for CIFAR-10 [43]. To evaluate the baselines, we randomly select one trained
classier as the source model that the baselines attack while the remaining classifiers are taken to be
held out target models. Our results in this setting are summarized in Table 1. As can be observed,
adversarial examples found using AEG exhibit the highest transferability to other MNIST classifiers.
On CIFAR-10 we find that AEG adversarial examples are competitive with the baselines (i.e., within
1.4%), though some baselines achieve near perfect transfer in this setting. In addition to NoBox
baselines, we also compare our approach with strong whitebox and blackbox query baselines adapted
to the NoBox setting [16, 17, 48, 2, 65]. These results and samples of adversarial examples generated
by g are provided in Appendix B.2.
Dataset MI-Attack DI-Attack TID-Attack SGM-Attack AEG (Ours)
MNIST 93.7± 1.1 95.9 ± 1.6 92.8± 2.7 N/A 96.1± 2.3
CIFAR-10 99.9 ±0.1 99.9 ± 0.1 19.7± 1.5 99.8 ± 0.3 98.5± 0.7
Table 1: Error rates on D for NoBox known architecture attacks with  = .3 and  = .03125
Q2: Architecture Transfer Attacks. We now consider NoBox attacks where we do not know
the architecture of the target model. For evaluation, we use CIFAR-10 and train 10 instances of
VGG-16 [59], ResNet-18 (RN-18) [34], Wide ResNet (WR) [72], DenseNet-121 (DN-121) [35] and
Inception-V3 architectures (Inc-V3) [63]. Here, we optimize the attack approaches against a single
pre-trained classifier from a particular architecture and then evaluate their attack success on classifiers
from distinct architectures. Our findings when using ResNet-18, DenseNet-121 and the Wide ResNet
as the source architecture are provided in Table 2. When attacks are performed with a DN-121 source
model, we observe that our AEG framework consistently outperforms the baselines. We hypothesize
that as DN-121 can represent a relatively large hypothesis class, this leads to a particularly effective
generator in the AEG framework. When using RN-18, we find that AEG is on par with and sometimes
exceeds the state-of-the-art baselines. Finally, when using WR, we again obtain competitive results,
except when the target model is VGG-16, which we believe is driven by the large mismatch in the
underlying hypothesis classes for the WR and VGG-16 architectures.
Q3: Attacking Robust Classifiers. We now test the ability of our AEG framework to attack target
models that have been robustified using adversarial and ensemble adversarial training [51, 64]. For
evaluation against PGD adversarial training, we use the public models as part of the MNIST and
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Source Attack VGG-16 RN-18 WR DN-121 Inc-V3
Clean 11.2± 0.9 13.1± 2.0 6.8± 0.7 11.2± 1.4 9.9± 1.3
RN-18
MI-Attack 71.2± 1.3 83.6± 0.3 66.6± 1.1 74.5± 1.4 76.8± 1.4
DI-Attack 72.6 ± 1.3 87.1 ± 0.5 73.0 ± 1.3 83.4 ± 1.0 79.8 ± 1.3
TID-Attack 22.6± 2.0 26.6± 1.9 13.5± 1.4 22.1± 2.1 19.2± 1.4
SGM-Attack 68.4± 1.8 79.5± 0.5 64.3± 1.6 73.8± 1.0 70.6± 1.7
AEG (Ours) 71.4 ± 3.0 88.9 ± 0.6 70.0 ± 2.5 84.5 ± 2.5 81.8 ± 1.7
DN-121
MI-Attack 54.7± 1.4 62.8± 1.1 55.5± 1.3 66.1± 1.5 64.3± 0.7
DI-Attack 61.1± 1.9 69.1± 0.8 64.1± 1.5 77.1± 1.2 71.6± 1.6
TID-Attack 20.1± 1.9 22.6± 2.5 13.3± 1.4 20.9± 1.6 21.6± 2.2
SGM-Attack 51.6± 0.7 60.2± 1.3 52.6± 0.9 64.7± 1.6 61.4± 1.3
AEG (Ours) 69.0 ± 3.8 85.6 ± 1.5 78.6 ± 2.1 89.4 ± 1.5 84.9 ± 1.9
WR
MI-Attack 71.2± 2.2 86.0± 1.7 99.9 ± 0.1 89.0± 2.6 88.2± 1.4
DI-Attack 75.4 ± 1.5 88.5 ± 2.1 99.9 ± 0.1 91.2 ± 1.6 91.5 ± 1.8
TID-Attack 21.9± 2.2 25.2± 1.7 19.7± 1.5 21.9± 1.7 21.9± 1.9
SGM-Attack 69.1± 2.1 88.6 ± 2.0 99.6 ± 0.4 90.7 ± 1.9 86.8± 2.2
AEG (Ours) 40.8± 3.22 70.6± 4.9 98.5± 0.6 88.2 ± 4.6 89.6 ± 1.8
Table 2: Error rates on D for average NoBox architecture transfer attacks with  = 0.03125
CIFAR-10 adversarial examples challenge. 7 For ensemble adversarial training, we follow the
approach of Tramèr et al. [64] (see Appendix C.4). We report our results in Table 3 and average
the result of stochastic attacks over 5 runs. We find that the AEG adversarial examples are able
to succesfully models robustified through ensemble adversarial training. Specifically, AEG is
competitive with most baselines but falls short of the powerful MI-Attack on the MNIST dataset. On
CIFAR-10, we find that DI-Attack and TID-Attack to be the strongest and that AEG attacks are less
effective. This is unsurprising, due to the inherent difficulties in saddle point optimization [26, 5] and
since ensemble adversarial training involves injecting adversarial examples from other architectures,
extending the underlying hypothesis class beyond which the generator was optimized on. Thus the
chosen representative classifier classifier is suboptimal compared to representational power of the
target model which constitutes an ensemble of architectures. Against PGD adversarial training, we
observe that AEG adversarial examples matches SOTA for MNIST while exceeds it on CIFAR-10.
We reconcile this result by recalling the saddle point of the AEG framework corresponds to attacking
the strongest robustified classifier which includes classifiers robustified via PGD adversarial training.
Dataset Defence Clean MI-Att† DI-Att TID-Att SGM-Att † AEG (Ours)
MNIST
Aens4 0.8 41.4 42.7 ± 0.8 16.0± 1.0 N/A 29.2± 1.4
Bens4 0.7 42.2 38.7± 0.7 25.8± 0.4 N/A 40.2± 0.9
Cens4 0.8 73.0 30.0± 1.5 9.5± 0.3 N/A 37.1± 0.0
Dens4 1.8 84.4 76.0± 1.4 81.3± 0.8 N/A 67.9± 1.6
Madry-Adv 0.8 2.0 3.1 ± 0.2 2.5± 0.2 N/A 3.0 ± 0.2
CIFAR-10
RN-18ens3 16.8 17.6 21.6± 0.8 33.1 ± 1.4 19.9 19.5± 0.0
WRens3 12.8 18.4 20.6± 1.0 28.8 ± 0.8 18.0 15.2± 0.0
DN-121ens3 21.5 20.3 22.7± 1.1 31.3 ± 0.3 21.9 19.9± 0.0
Inc-V3ens3 14.8 19.5 42.2 ± 1.3* 30.2± 0.6∗ 35.5* 23.0± 0.0
Madry-Adv 12.9 17.2 16.6± 0.2 16.6± 0.5 16.0 18.7 ± 0.0
Table 3: Error rates on D for NoBox known architecture attacks against Adversarial Training and Ensemble
Adversarial Training. ∗ Attacks were done using WR. † Deterministic attack.
6 Related Work
In addition to non-interactive blackbox adversaries, we compare against there exists multiple hybrid
approach’s that combine crafting attacks on surrogate models which then serve as a good initialization
point for queries to the target model [54, 58, 37]. Other notable approaches to craft blackbox transfer
attacks learning ghost networks [46] and transforming whitebox gradients with small ResNets [47].
There is also a burgeoning literature of using parametric models to craft adversarial attacks such as
7https://github.com/MadryLab/[dataset]_challenge, for [dataset] in {cifar10, mnist}.
Note that our threat model is more challenging than these challenges as we use non-robust source models.
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the Adversarial Transformation Networks framework and its variants [4, 69]. Similar in spirit to our
approach many attacks strategies benefit from employing a latent space to craft attacks [73, 65, 9].
However, unlike our work, these strategies cannot be used to attack entire hypothesis classes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the Adversarial Example Games (AEG) framework which provides a
principled foundation for crafting adversarial attacks in the NoBox threat model. Our work sheds light
on the existence of adversarial examples as a natural consequence of restricted entropy maximization
under a hypothesis class and leads to an actionable strategy for attacking all functions taken from
this class. Empirically we observe a high attack success rate in the known architecture variant of the
NoBox setting, improving over prior methods on MNIST and competitive performance on CIFAR-10.
For architecture transfer attacks, our approach is on par or exceeds all other baselines when the
representative classifier is taken to be either a ResNet-18 or DenseNet-121 and is competitive when
using Wide-ResNet. Finally, we find that AEG beats prior approaches in attacking PGD adversarially
trained models on both MNIST and CIFAR, while for ensemble adversarially trained models AEG is
competitive with existing baselines despite a large mismatch in hypothesis classes due to ensembling.
While promising, our empirical analysis also highlights the inherent challenges in saddle point
optimization [5] for generating theoretically optimal attacks.
Broader Impact
Adversarial attacks, especially ones under more realistic threat models, pose several important
security, ethical, and privacy risks. In this work, we introduce the NoBox attack setting, which
generalizes many other blackbox transfer settings, and we provide a novel framework to ground and
study attacks theoretically and their transferability to other functions within a class of functions. As
the NoBox threat model represents a more realistic setting for adversarial attacks, our research has
the potential to be used against a class of machine learning models in the wild. In particular, in terms
of risk, malicious actors could use approaches based on our framework to generate attack vectors that
compromise production ML systems or potentially bias them toward specific outcomes.
As a concrete example, one can consider creating transferrable examples in the physical world, such
as the computer vision systems of autonomous cars. While prior works have shown the possibility of
such adversarial examples —i.e., adversarial traffic signs, we note that there is a significant gap in
translating synthetic adversarial examples to adversarial examples that reside in the physical world
[45]. Understanding and analyzing the NoBox transferability of adversarial examples to the physical
world—in order to provide public and academic visibility on these risks—is an important direction for
future research. Based on the known risks of designing new kinds of adversarial attacks—discussed
above—we now outline the ways in which our research is informed by the intent to mitigate these
potential societal risks. For instance, our research demonstrates that one can successfully craft
adversarial attacks even in the challenging NoBox setting. It raises many important considerations
when developing robustness approaches. A straightforward extension is to consider our adversarial
example game (AEG) framework as a tool for training robust models. On the theoretical side,
exploring formal verification of neural networks against NoBox adversaries is an exciting direction
for continued exploration. As an application, ML practitioners in the industry may choose to employ
new forms of A/B testing with different types of adversarial examples, of which AEG is one method
to robustify and stress test production systems further. Such an application falls in line with other
general approaches to red teaming AI systems [10] and verifiability in AI development. In essence,
the goal of such approaches, including adversarial examples for robustness, is to align AI systems’
failure modes to those found in human decision making.
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Adversarial Example Games
Supplementary Materials
A Proofs for Section 4 (Theoretical results)
Proposition 1. If ` is the cross entropy loss, one has access to any measurable g respecting the
proximity constraint in (2), and the class F of classifier is convex, then we can switch min and max
in (AEG), i.e.,
min
fc∈F
max
g∈G
ϕλ(fc, g) = max
g∈G
min
fc∈F
ϕλ(fc, g) (4)
Proof. In this proof we have `(p, y) := −∑Ki=1 yi ln(pi) where K is the number of classes one-hot
encoded in y. However, what we only need in our proof is that the loss ` is convex.
Let us recall that the payoff ϕ is defined as
max
g∈G
min
f∈F
E(x,y)∼pdata,z∼pz [`(f(g(x, y, z)), y)] =: ϕ(f, g) (9)
Let us consider the case where X is finite as a warm-up. In practice, this can be the case if we consider
that for instance one only allow a finite number of values for the pixels, e.g. (integers between 0 and
255 for CIFAR-10). In that case we have that
Padv(x, y) =
∑
x′∈X
Pdata(x′, y)Pg(x|x′, y) where ‖x− x′‖ > ⇒ Pg(x|x′, y) = 0 . (10)
Assuming that one can achieve any Pg(·|x′, y) respecting the proximity constraint, the set {Padv}
is convex and compact. It is compact because closed and bounded in finite dimension and convex
because of the linear dependence in Pg in (10) (and the fact that if Pg1 and Pg2 respect the constraints
then λPg1 + (1− λ)Pg2 does it too).
For the non finite input case, we can consider that the generator G is a random variable defined on
the probability space (X × Y × Z,B,P(x,y) × Pz := P) where B is the Borel σ-algebra, P(x,y) the
probability on the space of data and Pz the probability on the latent space.
Then the adversarial distributions we consider is the set of pushforward distributions P ◦G−1 with G
such that
G(x, y, z) = (g(x, y, z), y) and d(g(x, y, z), x) ≤  . (11)
Assuming that g can achieve any random variable that satisfies (11), the minimax problem (4) can be
rewritten as
min
f
max
pg∈∆(X×Y)
ϕ(f, g) = max
pg∈∆(X×Y)
min
f
ϕ(f, g) (12)
where ∆(X × Y) := {P ◦G−1 |G measurable satisfying (11)} . This set is convex: let us consider
P ◦G−11 and P ◦G−12 we have that
λP ◦G−11 + (1− λ)P ◦G−12 = P ◦G−13 (13)
where g3(x, y, z) = δ(z)g1(x, y, z) + (1− δ(z))g2(x, y, z) and where δ ∼ Ber(λ).
By using Skorokhod’s representation theorem [7] we can show that this set is closed and thus compact
(as closed subsets of compact sets are compact) using the weak convergence of measures as topology.
Thus it is a convex compact Haussdorf space and in both cases (X finite and infinite) and we can
apply Fan’s Theorem.
Theorem 1. [25, Theorem 2] Let U be a compact and convex Hausdorff space and V an arbitrary
convex set. Let ϕ be a real valued function on U × V such that for every v ∈ V the function ϕ(·, v)
is lower semi-continuous on U . If ϕ is convex-concave then,
min
u∈U
sup
v∈V
ϕ(u, v) = sup
v∈V
min
u∈U
ϕ(u, v) (14)
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Proposition 2. If the generator is allowed to generate any `∞ perturbations. The optimal represen-
tative classifier is the solution of the following `1 regularized logistic regression
w∗ ∈ arg min
w
E(x,y)∼D[log(1 + e−y·w
>x+‖w‖1)] . (6)
Moreover if ω∗ has no zero entry, the optimal generator is g∗(x, y) = x − y ·  sign(w∗), is
deterministic and the pair (fw∗ , g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (5).
Proof. We prove the result here for any given norm ‖ · ‖. Let us consider the loss for a given pair
(x, y)
log(1 + ey(w
>g(x,y)+b)) (15)
then by the fact that x 7→ log(1 + ex) is increasing, maximizing this term for ‖g(x, y)− x‖∞ ≤ ,
boils down to solve the following maximization step,
max
δ , ‖δ‖≤
y(w>δ) = ‖w‖∗ (16)
Particularly, for the `∞ norm we get
arg max
δ , ‖δ‖∞≤
y(w>δ) = y sign(w) . (17)
and
max
g
E(x,y)∼pdata [log(1 + e
y(w>g(x,y)+b))] = E(x,y)∼pdata [log(1 + e
y(w>x+b)+‖w‖1)] (18)
To show that (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (5), we first notice that by construction
ϕ(f∗, g∗) = min
f∈F
max
g
ϕ(f, g) (19)
where F is the class of classifier with linear logits. We then just need to notice that for all f ∈ F we
have,
ϕ(f, g∗) = E(x,y)∼pdata [log(1 + e
−y(w>x+b)+w> sign(w∗))] (20)
That is a convex problem in (w, b). Since, in a neighborhood of w∗ we have that w> sign(w∗) =
‖w∣∣
supp(w∗)‖1. Thus by assuming that w∗ is full support and since w∗ minimize (6) we have that
∇wϕ(w∗, b∗, g∗) = ∇wE(x,y)∼pdata [log(1 + e−y(w
>x+b)+‖w‖1)] = 0 (21)
Finally, by convexity of the problem (20) we can conclude that w∗ is a minimizer of ϕ(·, g∗). To
sum-up we have that
ϕ(f∗, g) ≤ ϕ(f∗, g∗) ≤ ϕ(f, g∗) (22)
meaning that (f∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium of (5).
Proposition 3. The F-entropy is a decreasing function of F , i.e., for any F1 ⊂ F2,
HF1(pg) ≥ HF2(pg) ≥ Hy(pg) := Ex∼px [H(pg(·|x))] .
where H(p(·|x)) := ∑y∈Y p(y|x) ln p(y|x) is the entropy of the conditional distribution p(y|x).
Proof. In the case where f∗(x) := p(y|x) ∈ F , since f∗ a minimizer of the expected cross entropy
loss over the class of any function, we have that
Hy(p) := min
f∈XY
E(x,y)∼p[`(f(x), y)] = Ex[H(p(·|x))] (23)
Lemma 1. Given a data distribution (x, y) ∼ padv a minimizer of the cross entropy loss is
padv(y|·) ∈ arg min
f
E(x,y)∼padv [`(f(x), y)] . (24)
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Proof. Let us start by noticing that,
min
f
E(x,y)∼p[`(f(x), y)] = Ex∼px min
q=f(x)
Ey∼p(·|x)[`(q, y)] (25)
Using the fact that ` is the cross-entropy loss we get
Ey∼p(·|x)[`(q, y)] = Ey∼p(·|x)[−
K∑
i=1
yi ln(qi)] = −
K∑
i=1
pi ln(qi) (26)
where we noted pi = p(y = i|x). Noticing that since qi is a probability distribution we have∑K
i=1 qi = 1, we have,
Ey∼p(·|x)[`(q, y)] = −
K−1∑
i=1
pi ln(qi)− pK ln(1−
K−1∑
i=1
qi) (27)
we can then differentiate this loss with respect to qi ≥ 0 and get,
∂Ey∼p(·|x)[`(q, y)]
∂qi
(q) = −pi
qi
+
pK
qK
(28)
We can finally notice that qi = pi is a feasible solution.
B Additional results
B.1 Quantitative Results
We now provide additional results in the form of whitebox and blackbox query attacks adapted to
the NoBox evaluation protocol for Known-Architecture attacks which is the experimental setting in
Q1. For whitebox attacks we evaluate APGD-CE and APGD-DLR [17] which are improvements
over the powerful PGD attack [51]. When ensembled with another powerful perturbation minimizing
whitebox attack FAB [16] and the query efficient blackbox Square attacks [2] yields the current
SOTA attack strategy called AutoAttack [17] [17]. Additionally, we compare with two parametric
blackbox query approaches that both utilize a latent space in AutoZoom [65] and NAttack [48]. To
test transferability of whitebox and blackbox query attacks in the NoBox known architecture setting
we give generous iteration and query budgets (10x the reported settings in the original papers) when
attacking the source models, but only a single query for each target model. It is interesting to note that
APGD variant whitebox attacks are significantly more effective than query based blackbox attacks but
lack the same effectiveness of NoBox baselines. We hypothesize that the transferability of whitebox
attacks may be due to the fact that different functions learn similar decision boundaries but different
enough such that minimum distortion whitebox attacks such as FAB are ineffective.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Whitebox
AutoAttack* 84.4± 5.1 91.0± 1.9
APGD-CE 95.8± 1.9 97.5± 0.7
APGD-DLR 83.9± 5.4 90.7± 2.1
FAB 5.4± 2.2 10.4± 1.7
Blackbox-query
Square 60.9± 10.3 21.9± 2.8
N -Attack 9.5± 3.2 56.7± 8.9
Non-Interactive
Blackbox
MI-Attack 93.7± 1.1 99.9 ±0.1
DI-Attack 95.9± 1.6 99.9 ± 0.1
TID-Attack 92.8± 2.7 19.7± 1.5
SGM-Attack N/A 99.8 ±0.3
AEG (Ours) 98.9 ± 1.4 98.5± 0.6
Table 4: Test error rates for average blackbox transfer over architectures at  = 0.3 (higher is better)
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B.2 Qualitative Results
As a sanity check we also provide some qualitative results about the generated adversarial attacks.
In Figure 2 we show the 256 attacked samples generated by our method on MNIST. In Figure 3 we
show on the left the 256 CIFAR samples to attack, and on the right the perturbations generated by our
method amplified by a factor 10.
Figure 2: Attacks generated on MNIST by our method.
Figure 3: Left: CIFAR examples to attack. Right: Pertubations generated by our method amplified
by a factor 10. An interesting observation is that the generator learns not to attack the pixel where the
background is white.
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yEncoder Decoder
z = Concat(z1 ∼ π(x),Enc(x))
Noise
Critic
Batch Input
Generator
Labels
Figure 4: AEG framework architecture
d-ResBlock
Input:x
Forward for computing F (x):
Reflection pad (1)
conv. (ker: 3×3, d→ d; stride: 1; pad: 1)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
Reflection pad (1)
conv. (ker: 3×3, d→ d; stride: 1; pad: 1)
Batch Normalization
Output:x+ F (x)
Table 5: ResNet blocks used for the ResNet architectures (see Table 6) for the Generator. Each ResNet
block contains skip connection (bypass), and a sequence of convolutional layers, normalization, and
the ReLU non–linearity.
C Implementation Details
C.1 AEG Architecture
The high-level architecture of our AEG framework is illustraded in Figure 4. The generator takes
the input x and encode it into ψ(x), then the generator uses this encoding to compute a probability
vector p(ψ(x)) in the probability simplex of size K, the number of classes. Using this probability
vector the network then samples a categorical variable z according to a multinomial distribution of
parameter p(ψ(x)). Intuitively, this category may correspond to a target for the attack. Gradient,
is backprogated across this categorical variable using the gamble-softmax trick [41, 50]. Finally,
the decoder takes as input ψ(x), z and the label y to output an adversarial perturbation δ such that
‖δ‖ ≤ . In the case of the `∞ norm the constraint is insured by having a last non-linearity equals to
 · tanh. We then compute `(f(x+ δ), y) where f is the critic and ` the cross entropy loss. We solve
the game using the ExtraAdam optimizer [26] with a learning rate of 10−3. We allow the generator
to update its parameters several times on the same batch of examples before updating the critic. In
particular we update the generator until it is able to fool the critic or it reaches some fixed number of
iterations. We set this max number of iterations to 20 in all our experiments.
C.2 Generator Architecture
The architecture we used for the encoder and the decoder is described in Table 6 and 7. For MNIST
we used a standard convolutional architecture and for CIFAR-10 we used a ResNet architecture.
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Encoder
Input: x ∈ R3×32×32
Reflection Padding (3)
conv. (ker: 7×7, 32→ 63; stride: 1; pad: 0)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
conv. (ker: 3×3, 63→ 127; stride: 2; pad: 0)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
conv. (ker: 3×3, 127→ 255; stride: 2; pad: 0)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
255-ResBlock
255-ResBlock
255-ResBlock
Decoder
Input: (ψ(x), z, y) ∈ R256×8×8
256-ResBlock
256-ResBlock
256-ResBlock
Transp. conv. (ker: 3×3, 256→ 128; stride: 2; pad: 0)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
Transp. conv. (ker: 3×3, 128→ 64; stride: 2; pad: 0)
Batch Normalization
ReLU
ReflectionPadding(3)
conv. (ker: 7×7, 64→ 32; stride: 1; pad: 0)
Tanh
Table 6: Encoder and Decoder for the convolutional generator used for the MNIST dataset.
Encoder
Input: x ∈ R28×28
conv. (ker: 3×3, 1→ 64; stride: 3; pad: 1)
LeakyReLU(0.2)
Max Pooling (stride: 2)
conv. (ker: 3×3, 64→ 32; stride: 2; pad: 1)
LeakyReLU(0.2)
Max Pooling (stride: 2)
Decoder
Input: (ψ(x), z, y) ∈ R64×2×2
Transp. conv. (ker: 3×3, 64→ 32; stride: 2; pad: 1)
LeakyReLU(0.2)
Max Pooling stride 2
Reflection Padding (3)
Transp. conv. (ker: 5×5, 32→ 16; stride: 3; pad: 1)
LeakyReLU(0.2)
Max Pooling stride 2
Transp. conv. (ker: 2×2, 16→ 1; stride: 2; pad: 1)
Tanh
Table 7: Encoder and Decoder for the ResNet generator used for the MNIST dataset.
C.3 Baseline Implementation Details
The principal baselines used in the main paper include the Momentum-Iterative Attack (MI-Attack)
[21], the Input Diversity (DI-Attack)[70], the Translation-Invariant (TID-Attack) [22] and the Skip
Gradient Method (SGM-Attack) [68]. As Input Diversity and Translation invariant are approaches that
generally can be combined with existing attack strategies we choose to use the powerful Momentum-
Iterative attack as our base attack. Thus the DI-Attack consists of random input transformations when
using an MI-Attack adversary while the TID-attack further adds a convolutional kernel ontop of the
DI-Attack. We base our implementions using the AdverTorch [19] library and adapt all baselines
to this framework using original implementations where available. In particular, when possible we
reused open source code in the Pytorch library [56] otherwise we re-implement existing algorithms.
We also inherit most hyperparameters settings when reporting baseline results except for number
steps used in iterated attacks. We find that most iterated attacks benefit from additional optimization
steps when attacking MNIST and CIFAR-10 classifiers. Specifically, we allot a 100 step budget for
all iterated attacks which is often a five to ten fold increase than the reported setting in all baselines.
C.4 Ensemble Adversarial Training Architectures
We ensemble adversarially train our models in accordance with the training protocol outlined in [64].
For MNIST models we train a standard model for 6 epochs, and an ensemble adversarial model using
adversarial examples from the remaining three architectures for 12 epochs. The specific architectures
for Models A-D are provided in Table. 8. Similarly, for CIFAR-10 we train both the standard model
and ensemble adversarial models for 50 epochs. For computationally efficiency we randomly sample
two out of three held out architectures when ensemble adversarially training the source model.
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A B C D
Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(128, 3, 3) + Tanh FC(300) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu Conv(64, 8, 8) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
Dropout(0.25) Conv(128, 6, 6) + Relu Conv(64, 3, 3) + Tanh FC(300) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)FC(128) + Relu Conv(128, 6, 6) + Relu MaxPool(2,2)
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) FC(128) + Relu FC(300) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)FC + Softmax FC + Softmax FC + Softmax
FC(300) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)
FC + Softmax
Table 8: MNIST Ensemble Adversarial Training Architectures)
D Further Related Work
Adversarial attacks can be classified under different threat models, which impose different access and
resource restrictions on the attacker [1]. The whitebox setting, where the attacker has full access to
the model parameters and outputs, thus allowing the attacker to utilize gradients based methods to
solve a constrained optimization procedure. This setting is more permissive than the semi-whtiebox
and the blackbox setting, the latter of which the attacker has only access to the prediction [54, 55]
or sometimes the predicted confidence [33]. In this paper, we focus on a challenging variant of the
conventional blackbox threat model which we call the NoBox setting which further restricts the
attacker by not allowing any query from the target model. While there exists a vast literature of
adversarial attacks, we focus on ones that are most related to our setting and direct the interested
reader to comprehensive surveys for adversarial attacks and blackbox adversarial attacks [6, 14].
Whitebox Attacks. The most common threat model for whitebox adversarial examples are lp-norm
attacks, where p ∈ {2,∞} is the choice of norm ball used to define the attack budget. One of the
earliest gradient based attacks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [30], which computes
bounded perturbations in a single step by computing the signed gradient of the loss function with
respect to a clean input. More powerful adversaries can be computed using multi-step attacks such as
DeepFool [53] which iteratively finds the minimum distance over perturbation direction needed to
cross a decision boundary. For constrained optimization problems the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack
[12] is a powerful iterative optimization scheme which introduces an attack objective designed to
maximize the distance between the target class and the most likely adversarial class. Similarly,
projected gradient descent based attacks has been shown to be the strongest class of adversaries
for l2 and l∞ norm attacks [51] and even provides a natural way of robustifying models through
adversarial training. Extensions of PGD that fix failures due to suboptimal step size and problems of
the objective function include AutoPGD-CE (APGD-CE) and AutoPGD-DLR (APGD-DLR) and
leads to the state of the art whitebox attack in AutoAttack [17] which ensembles two other strong
diverse and parameter free attacks.
Blackbox Attacks. Like whitebox attacks the adversarial goal for a blackbox attacker remains the
same with the most common threat model also being lp norm attacks. Unlike, whitebox attacks the
adversarial capabilities of the attacker is severely restricted rendering exact gradient computation
impossible. In lieu of exact gradients, early blackbox attacks generated adversarial examples on
surrogate models in combination with queries to the target model [54]. When given a query budget
gradient estimation is an attractive approach with notable approaches utilizing black box optimization
schemes such as Finite Differences [15], Natural Evolutionary Strategies [39, 42], learned priors in a
bandit optimization framework [40], meta-learning attack patterns [23], and query efficient
Defenses. In order to protect against the security risk posed by adversarial examples there have been
many proposed defense strategies. Here we provide a non-exhaustive list of such methods. Broadly
speaking, most defense approaches can be categorized into either robust optimization techniques,
gradient obfuscation methods, or adversarial example detection algorithms [71]. Robust optimization
techniques aim to improve the robustness of a classifier by learning model parameters by incorporating
adversarial examples from a given attack into the training process [51, 64, 20]. On the other hand
obfuscation methods rely on masking the input gradient needed by an attacker to construct adversarial
examples [60, 10, 32, 18].
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In adversarial example detection schemes the defender seeks to sanitize the inputs to the target model
by rejecting any it deems adversarial. Often this involves training auxiliary classifiers or differences
in statistics between adversarial examples and clean data [31, 52, 28].
Finally, Erraqabi et al. [24] developed an adversarial game framework as a mean for building robust
representations where an additional disciminator is trained to disciminate adversarial example from
natural ones, based on the representation of the current classifier.
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